A computational secret-sharing scheme is a method that enables a dealer, that has a secret, to distribute this secret among a set of parties such that a "qualified" subset of parties can reconstruct the secret while any "unqualified" subset of parties cannot efficiently learn anything about the secret. The collection of "qualified" subsets is defined by a monotone Boolean function.
Introduction
A secret-sharing scheme is a method that enables a dealer, that has a secret piece of information, to distribute this secret among n parties such that a "qualified" subset of parties has enough information to reconstruct the secret while any "unqualified" subset of parties learns nothing about the secret. A monotone collection of "qualified" subsets (i.e., subsets of parties that can reconstruct the secret) is known as an access structure, and is usually identified with its characteristic monotone function. 1 Besides being interesting in their own right, secret-sharing schemes are an important building block in many cryptographic protocols, especially those involving some notion of "qualified" sets (e.g., multi-party computation, threshold cryptography and Byzantine agreement). For more information we refer to the extensive survey of Beimel on secret-sharing schemes and their applications [Bei11] .
A significant goal in constructing secret-sharing schemes is to minimize the amount of information distributed to the parties. We say that a secret-sharing scheme is efficient if the size of all shares is polynomial in the number of parties and the size of the secret.
Secret-sharing schemes were introduced in the late 1970s by Blakley [Bla79] and Shamir [Sha79] for the threshold access structure, i.e., where the subsets that can reconstruct the secret are all the sets whose cardinality is at least a certain threshold. Their constructions were fairly efficient both in the size of the shares and in the computation required for sharing and reconstruction. Ito, Saito and Nishizeki [ISN93] considered general access structures and showed that every monotone access structure has a (possibly inefficient) secret-sharing scheme that realizes it. In their scheme the size of the shares is proportional to the size of the DNF for the corresponding function. Benaloh and Leichter [BL88] proved that if an access structure can be described by a polynomial-size monotone formula, then it has an efficient secret-sharing scheme. The most general class for which secret sharing is known was suggested by Karchmer and Wigderson [KW93] who showed that if the access structure can be described by a polynomial-size monotone span program (for instance, undirected connectivity in a graph), then it has an efficient secret-sharing scheme. Beimel and Ishai [BI05] proposed a secret-sharing scheme for an access structure which is conjectured to lie outside NC. On the other hand, there are no known lower bounds that show that there exists an access structure that requires only inefficient secret-sharing schemes. 2 In the secret-sharing schemes considered above the security is guaranteed even if the parties are computationally unbounded. These secret-sharing schemes are known as perfect secret-sharing schemes. A natural variant, known as computational secret-sharing schemes, is to allow only computationally limited dealers and parties, i.e., they are probabilistic algorithms that run in polynomialtime. More precisely, a computational secret-sharing scheme is a secret-sharing scheme in which there exists an efficient dealer that generates the shares such that a "qualified" subset of parties can efficiently reconstruct the secret, however, an "unqualified" subset that pulls its shares together but has only limited (i.e., polynomial) computational power and attempts to reconstruct the secret should fail (with high probability). Krawczyk [Kra93] presented a computational secret-sharing scheme for threshold access structures that is more efficient (in terms of the size of the shares) than 1 It is most sensible to consider only monotone sets of "qualified" subsets of parties. A set M of subsets is called monotone if A ∈ M and A ⊆ A ′ , then A ′ ∈ M . It is hard to imagine a meaningful method for sharing a secret to a set of "qualified" subsets that does not satisfy this property.
2 Moreover, there are not even non-constructive lower bounds for secret-sharing schemes. The usual counting arguments (e.g., arguments that show that most functions require large circuits) do not work here since one needs to enumerate over the sharing and reconstruction algorithms whose complexity may be larger than the share size.
the perfect secret-sharing schemes given by Blakley and Shamir [Bla79, Sha79] . In an unpublished work (mentioned in [Bei11] , see also Vinod et al. [VNS + 03]), Yao showed an efficient computational secret-sharing scheme (assuming the existence of one-way functions) for access structures whose characteristic function can be computed by a polynomial-size monotone circuit (as opposed to the perfect secret-sharing of Benaloch and Leichter [BL88] for polynomial-size monotone formulas). There are access structures which are known to have an efficient computational secret-sharing schemes but are not known to have efficient perfect secret-sharing schemes, e.g., directed connectivity. 3 Yao's scheme does not include all monotone access structures with an efficient algorithm to determine eligibility. One notable example where no efficient secret-sharing is known is matching in a graph. 4 Thus, a major open problem is to understand which access structures have efficient computational secret-sharing schemes, and what cryptographic assumptions are required for that.
Around 1990 Steven Rudich raised the possibility of obtaining secret-sharing schemes for an even more general class of access structures than P: monotone functions in NP, also known as mNP. 5 An access structure that is defined by a function in mNP is called an mNP access structure. Intuitively, a secret-sharing scheme for an mNP access structure is defined (in the natural way) as following: for the "qualified" subsets there is a witness attesting to this fact and given the witness it should be possible to reconstruct the secret. On the other hand, for the "unqualified" subsets there is no witness, and so it should not be possible to reconstruct the secret. For example, consider the Hamiltonian access structure. In this access structure the parties correspond to edges of the complete undirected graph, and a set of parties X is said to be "qualified" if and only if the corresponding set of edges contains a Hamiltonian cycle and the set of parties knows a witness attesting to this fact.
Rudich observed that if NP = coNP, then there is no perfect secret-sharing scheme for the Hamiltonian access structure in which the sharing of the secret can be done efficiently (i.e., in polynomial-time). 6 This (conditional) impossibility result motivates looking for computational secret-sharing schemes for the Hamiltonian access structure and other mNP access structures. Furthermore, Rudich showed that the construction of a computational secret-sharing schemes for the Hamiltonian access structure gives rise to a protocol for oblivious transfer. More precisely, Rudich showed that if one-way functions exist and there is a computational secret-sharing scheme for the Hamiltonian access structure (i.e., with efficient sharing and reconstruction), then efficient protocols for oblivious transfer exist. 7 In particular, constructing a computational secret-sharing scheme for the Hamiltonian access structure assuming one-way functions will resolve a major open problem in cryptography and prove that Minicrypt=Cryptomania, to use Impagliazzo's terminology [Imp95] .
In the decades since Rudich raised the possibility of access structures beyond P not much has happened. This changed with the work on Witness Encryption by Garg et al. [GGSW13] , where 3 In the access structure for directed connectivity, the parties correspond to edge slots in the complete directed graph and the "qualified" subsets are those edges that connect two distinguished nodes s and t. 4 In the access structure for matching the parties correspond to edge slots in the complete graph and the "qualified" subsets are those edges that contain a perfect matching. Even though matching is in P, it is known that there is no monotone circuit that computes it [Raz85] .
5 Rudich raised it in private communication with the second author around 1990 and was not written to the best of our knowledge; a description of some of Rudich's results can be found in Beimel's survey [Bei11] and in [Nao06] . 6 Moreover, it is possible to show that if NP ⊆ coAM, then there is no statistical secret-sharing scheme for the Hamiltonian access structure in which the sharing of the secret can be done efficiently [Nao06] .
7 The resulting reduction is non-black-box. Also, note that the results of Rudich apply for any other monotone NP-complete problem as well.
the goal is to encrypt a message relative to a statement x ∈ L for a language L ∈ NP such that: Anyone holding a witness to the statement can decrypt the message, however, if x / ∈ L, then it is computationally hard to decrypt. It is relatively simple to show that secret-sharing for an NP language L implies witness encryption for the statement x ∈ L (see Garg et al.) . A byproduct of the proposed construction of Garg et al. was a construction of a computational secret-sharing scheme for a specific monotone NP-complete language (3-EXACT COVER [Gol08, Proposition 2.25]) based on assumptions closely related to multilinear maps. However, it is unclear whether one can use a secret-sharing scheme for a specific (monotone) NP-complete language in order to achieve secret-sharing schemes for any language in mNP. We discuss this more in Appendix C.
Since the publication of Garg et al. [GGSW13] a proposed construction for another fascinating primitive emerged: indistinguishability obfuscation. In this paper, we construct a secret-sharing scheme for every mNP access structure assuming the existence of efficient indistinguishability obfuscation for all of P and one-way functions. In particular, our result gives an alternative construction of an efficient protocol for oblivious transfer assuming indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions than the one by Sahai and Waters [SW13] . We discuss the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation next and then state our main result.
Obfuscation. The study of methods to transform a program (say described as a Boolean circuit) into a form that is executable but otherwise completely unintelligible is a central research direction in cryptography. The latter task, known as obfuscation is an open problem in computer security from both practical and theoretical point of view.
The theoretical study of obfuscation was initiated by Barak et al.
[BGI + 12]. They studied several notions of obfuscation, primarily focusing on virtual black-box obfuscation. Virtual black-box obfuscation requires that anything that can be efficiently computed from the obfuscated program, can also be computed efficiently from black-box (i.e., input-output) access to the program. Their main result was that this notion of obfuscation cannot always be achieved. Indeed, they presented an explicit family of circuits that provably cannot be virtual black-box obfuscated (based on oneway functions). Other variants of definitions for obfuscation were introduced and proven to be impossible in some cases by Goldwasser and Kalai [GK05] and Goldwasser and Rothblum [GR07] . Barak et al. [BGI + 12] considered also an alternative notion of obfuscation called indistinguishability obfuscation (henceforth iO). An indistinguishability obfuscator guarantees that if two circuits compute the same function, then their obfuscated version (outputs of the obfuscator) are computationally indistinguishable. This definition is weaker than the virtual black-box one and hence may bypass the impossibility results shown for the latter. Indeed, (as shown by Barak et al.) it is easy to build inefficient indistinguishability obfuscators by outputting a "canonical" circuit which is equivalent to the original circuit. Apparently, one disadvantage of indistinguishability obfuscation is that it does not give an intuitive guarantee that the circuit hides information. For some functionalities, this is a major drawback.
Recently [BZ13] that iO can be combined with one-way functions to construct many powerful primitives such as public-key encryption, identity-based en-cryption, attribute-based encryption (via witness encryption), NIZK arguments, CCA encryption, deniable encryption with non-negligible advantage and traitor-tracing schemes with very short messages (note that the latter two primitives did not have any known construction). We note that without further assumptions, we cannot prove that iO implies one-way functions. Indeed, if P = NP then one-way functions do not exists, but iO does exist since the canonizing iO from above can be implemented efficiently. (Recently, Moran and Rosen [MR13] showed that if NP = coRP and efficient indistinguishability obfuscators exist, then one-way functions exist.) Therefore, we do not expect to build many "cryptographically interesting" tools just from iO, but usually need to combine it with other assumptions.
Our Results. We formally definite secret-sharing for mNP access structures, give two variants (indistinguishability and semantic security) and prove their equivalence. Our main result is a computational secret-sharing scheme for all mNP access structures assuming the existence of an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator for P and one-way functions. Theorem 1.1 (Informal). If efficient iO exists for P and one-way functions exist, then for every mNP access structure there is an efficient computational secret-sharing scheme.
Moreover, we show that the same result holds even when assuming the existence of an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator for a smaller class of circuits: 3CNF formulas (for more information we refer to Section 4.2). In particular, a simple candidate for an indistinguishability obfuscator for 3CNF formulas that is provably secure in an idealized algebraic model was recently suggested by Brakerski and Rothblum [BR14a] .
We remark that if we relax the requirement of computational secret-sharing such that a "qualified" subset of parties can reconstruct the secret with very high probability (say, negligibly close to 1), then our scheme from Theorem 1.1 actually gives a secret-sharing scheme for every monotone functions in MA.
Other Related Work
A different model of secret-sharing for mNP access structures was suggested by Vinod et al.
[VNS + 03]. Specifically, they relaxed the requirements of secret-sharing by introducing a semitrusted third party T who is allowed to interact with the dealer and the parties. They require that T does not learn anything about the secret and the participating parties. In this model, they constructed an efficient secret-sharing scheme for any mNP access structures (that is also efficient in terms of the round complexity of the parties with T ) assuming the existence of efficient oblivious transfer protocols.
Main Idea
Let M be an mNP access structure on n parties P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } with a verifier V M . We think of V M as a polynomial-size circuit. Recall that indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) is a functionality preserving (randomized) transformation on circuits that assures that if two circuits C 1 and C 2 agree on every input and have the same size, then iO(C 1 ) is computationally indistinguishable from iO(C 2 ).
Let Com be a commitment scheme. A secret-sharing scheme consists of a setup phase in which the dealer distributes secret shares to the parties. For i ∈ [n] the share of party p i is composed of the following parts:
1. A secret opening r i for a commitment to the value i. Clearly, if iO and Com are efficient, then the generation of the shares is efficient. Moreover, the reconstruction procedure is the natural one: Given a subset of parties X ⊆ P such that M (X) = 1 and a valid witness w such that V M (X, w) = 1, evaluate iO(C) on X and w. The tests of C will pass and iO(C) will output the secret S, by the definition of the circuit C.
As for the security of this scheme, we want to show that it is impossible to extract (or even learn anything about) the secret having a subset of parties X for which M (X) = 0 (i.e., an "unqualified" subset of parties). Let D be an algorithm that extracts the secret given X. Roughly speaking, we will use the ability to extract the secret in order to solve the following task: we are given a list of n unopened string commitments c 1 , . . . , c n and a promise that it either corresponds to the values A 0 = {1, . . . , n} or it corresponds to the values A 1 = {n + 1, . . . , 2n} and we need to decide which is the case. Succeeding in this task would break the security guarantee of the commitment scheme.
We sample n openings r 1 , . . . , r n uniformly at random and create a new circuit C ′ such that C ′ = C S,c ′ 1 ,...,c ′ n as above, where we replace the commitments corresponding to parties not in X with commitments from the input as follows:
we set the share of party p i to be r i , iO(C ′ ) . We run D with this new set of shares. If we are in the case where c 1 , . . . , c n corresponds to A 0 , then D is unable to distinguish between C and C ′ and, hence, will be able to extract the secret. On the other hand, if c 1 , . . . , c n corresponds to A 1 , then the circuit C ′ is equivalent to the NUL circuit. In this case, it is computationally hard to extract the secret from iO(C ′ ) since it is computationally indistinguishable from iO(Z) where Z is a canonical NUL circuit. Hence, if D is able to extract the secret S, then we deduce that c 1 , . . . , c n correspond to A 0 and, otherwise we conclude that c 1 , . . . , c n correspond to A 1 . We refer to Section 4 for the complete description of the scheme and the proof of its security.
Preliminaries
We start with some general notation. We denote by [n] the set of numbers {1, 2, . . . , n}. Throughout the paper we use n as our security parameter. We denote by U n the uniform distribution on n bits. For a distribution or random variable R we write r ← R to denote the operation of sampling a random element r according to R. For a set S, we write s R ←S to denote the operation of sampling an s uniformly at random from the set S. We denote by neg : N → R a function such that for every positive integer c there exists an integer N c such that for all n > N c , neg(n) < 1/n c .
Throughout this paper we deal with Boolean circuits. We denote by |C| the size of a circuit C and define it as the number of wires in C. Furthermore, we assume that the circuits have fan-in 2.
Monotone NP
A monotone Boolean circuits is a Boolean circuit with AND and OR gates (without negations). A non-deterministic circuit is a Boolean circuit whose inputs are divided into two parts: standard inputs and non-deterministic inputs. A non-deterministic circuit accepts a standard input if and only if there is some setting of the non-deterministic input that causes the circuit to evaluate to 1. A monotone non-deterministic circuit is a non-deterministic circuit where the monotonicity requirement applies only to the standard inputs, that is, every path from a standard input wire to the output wire does not have a negation gate.
Definition 2.1 ([GS92]).
We say that a function L is in mNP if there exists a uniform family of polynomial-size monotone non-deterministic circuit that computes L.
Lemma 2.2 ([GS92, Theorem 2.2])
. mNP = NP ∩ mono, where mono is the set of all monotone functions.
Computational Indistinguishability
Definition 2.3. Two sequences of random variables X = {X n } n∈N and Y = {Y n } n∈N are computationally indistinguishable if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A there exists an integer N such that for all n ≥ N ,
where the probabilities are over X n , Y n and the internal randomness of A.
Secret-Sharing
A perfect (resp., computational) secret-sharing scheme involves a dealer who has a secret, a set of n parties, and a collection A of "qualified" subsets of parties called the access structure. A secret-sharing scheme for A is a method by which the dealer (resp., efficiently) distributes shares to the parties such that (1) any subset in A can (resp., efficiently) reconstruct the secret from its shares, and (2) any subset not in A cannot (resp., efficiently) reveal any partial information on the secret. For more information on secret-sharing schemes we refer to [Bei11] and references therein.
Throughout this paper we deal with secret-sharing schemes for access structures over n parties P = P n = {p 1 , . . . , p n }.
Definition 2.4 (Access structure). An access structure M on P is a monotone set of subset of P. That is, for all X ∈ M it holds that X ⊆ P and for all X ∈ M and X ′ such that X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ P it holds that X ′ ∈ M .
We may think of M as a characteristic function M : 2 P → {0, 1} that outputs 1 given as input X ⊆ P if and only if X is in the access structure.
Many different definitions for secret-sharing schemes appeared in the literature. Some of the definitions were not stated formally and in some cases rigorous security proofs were not given. Bellare and Rogaway [BR07] survey many of these different definitions and recast them in the tradition of provable-security cryptography. They also provide some proofs for well-known secretsharing schemes that were previously unanalyzed. We refer to [BR07] for more information.
Indistinguishability Obfuscation
We say that two circuits C and C ′ are equivalent and denote it by C ≡ C ′ if they compute the same function (i.e., ∀x :
Definition 2.5 (Indistinguishability Obfuscator). Let C = {C n } n∈N be a class of polynomial-size circuits, where C n is a set of circuits operating on inputs of length n. A uniform algorithm iO is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for the class C if it takes as input a circuit in C and outputs a new circuit so that following properties are satisfied:
Preserving Functionality:
For any input length n ∈ N and any C ∈ C n we have that
where the probability is over the internal randomness of iO.
Polynomial Slowdown:
There is a polynomial p(·) such that for any input length n ∈ N and every circuit C ∈ C n it holds that |iO(C)| ≤ p(|C|).
Indistinguishable Obfuscation:
For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D there exists an n 0 such that for any n ≥ n 0 and any two equivalent circuits C 1 , C 2 ∈ C n of size k, it holds that
We say that iO is efficient if it runs in polynomial-time.
Remark. Our definition of Rudich secret-sharing (that is given in Section 3) is uniform. However, we note that we use a non-uniform definition of indistinguishability obfuscation (given in Definition 2.5) since this is the most common definition in the literature.
Commitment Schemes
A non-interactive statistically binding commitment scheme can be constructed based on any oneway permutation [Blu82] . Naor [Nao91] showed a construction of an interactive (two-round) statistically-binding commitment scheme based on any one-way function. For simplicity of presentation we will define commitment schemes in this paper to be non-interactive; however, all of our results still hold if the non-interactive commitment is replaced by Naor's construction. Definition 2.6 (Commitment Scheme). A polynomial-time computable function Com : {0, 1} × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} p(n) (where p(·) is some polynomial) is a bit commitment scheme if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Computational Hiding:
The random variables Com(0; U n ) and Com(1; U n ) are computationally indistinguishable.
Statistical Binding:
The supports of the above random variables are disjoint.
One can convert a bit commitment scheme into a string commitment scheme by concatenating independent commitments for each of the input bits. Thus, for x = x 1 · · · x ℓ ∈ {0, 1} ℓ and r = r (1) · · · r (ℓ) ∈ {0, 1} nℓ we define Com(x; r) = Com(x 1 ; r (1) ) · · · Com(x ℓ ; r (ℓ) ). We say that Com(x; r) is the commitment of the value x with the opening r.
The Definition of Rudich Secret-Sharing
In this section we formally define computational secret-sharing for access structures realizing monotone functions in NP, which we call Rudich secret-sharing. Even though secret-sharing for functions in NP were considered in the past [VNS + 03, Bei11, GGSW13], no formal definition was given. Our definition consists of two requirements: completeness and security. The completeness requirement assures that a "qualified" subset of parties that wishes to reconstruct the secret and knows the witness will be successful. The security requirement guarantees that as long as the parties form an "unqualified" subset, they are unable to learn the secret.
Note that the security requirement stated above is possibly hard to check efficiently: For some access structures in mNP (e.g., monotone NP-complete problems) it might be computationally hard to verify that the parties form an "unqualified" subset. Next, in Definition 3.1 we give a uniform definition of secret-sharing for NP.
Definition 3.1 (Rudich secret-sharing). Let M : 2 P → {0, 1} be an mNP access structure with a verifier V M . A secret-sharing scheme S for M consists of a setup procedure SETUP and a reconstruction procedure RECON that satisfy the following requirements:
1. SETUP(1 n , S) gets as input a secret S and distributes a share for each party. For i ∈ [n] denote by Π(S, i) the random variable that corresponds to the share of party p i . Furthermore, for X ⊆ P we denote by Π(S, X) the random variable that corresponds to the set of shares of parties in X.
Completeness:
If RECON(1 n , Π(S, X), w) gets as input the shares of a "qualified" subset of parties and a valid witness, and outputs the shared secret. Namely, for X ⊆ P if M (X) = 1, then for any valid witness w such that V M (X, w) = 1, it holds that:
where the probability is over the internal randomness of the scheme and of RECON.
3. Indistinguishability of the Secret:
For every pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp, D) where Samp(1 n ) defines a distribution over pairs of secrets S 0 , S 1 , a subset of parties X and auxiliary information σ, it holds that
where the probability is over the internal randomness of the scheme, the internal randomness of D and the distribution (S 0 , S 1 , X, σ) ← Samp(1 n ).
That is, for every pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp, D) such that Samp chooses two secrets S 0 , S 1 and a subset of parties X ⊆ P, if M (X) = 0 then D is unable to distinguish (with noticeable probability) between the shares of X generated by SETUP(S 0 ) and the shares of X generated by SETUP(S 1 ).
Notation. For ease of notation, 1 n and σ are omitted when they are clear from the context.
An Alternative Definition: Semantic Security
The security requirement (i.e., the third requirement) of a Rudich secret-sharing scheme that is given in Definition 3.1 is phrased in the spirit of computational indistinguishability. A different approach is to define the security of a Rudich secret-sharing in the spirit of semantic security. As in many cases (e.g., encryption [GM84] ), it turns out that the two definitions are equivalent.
Definition 3.2 (Rudich secret-sharing -semantic security version). Let M : 2 P → {0, 1} be an mNP access structure with verifier V M . A secret-sharing scheme S for M consists of a setup procedure SETUP and a reconstruction procedure RECON as in Definition 3.1 and has the following property instead of the indistinguishability of the secret property:
3 Unlearnability of the Secret:
For every pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp, D) where Samp(1 n ) defines a distribution over a secret S, a subset of parties X and auxiliary information σ, and for every efficiently computable function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * it holds that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D ′ (called a simulator) such that
where the probability is over the internal randomness of the scheme, the internal randomness of D and D ′ , and the distribution (S, X, σ) ← Samp(1 n ).
That is, for every pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp, D) such that Samp chooses a secret S and a subset of parties X ⊆ P, if M (X) = 0 then D is unable to learn anything about S that it could not learn without access to the secret shares of X.
Theorem 3.3. Definition 3.2 and Definition 3.1 are equivalent.
We defer the proof of Theorem 3.3 to Appendix A.
Definition of Adaptive Security
Our definition of Rudich secret-sharing only guarantees security against static adversaries. That is, the adversary chooses a subset of parties before it sees any of the shares. In other words, the selection is done independently of the sharing process and hence, we may think of it as if the sharing process is done after Samp chooses X. A stronger security guarantee would be to require that even an adversary that chooses its set of parties in an adaptive manner based on the shares it has seen so far is unable to learn the secret (or any partial information about it). Namely, the adversary chooses the parties one by one depending on the secret share of the previously chosen parties.
The security proof of our scheme (which is given in Section 4) does not hold under this stronger requirement. It would be interesting to strengthen it to the adaptive case as well. One problem that immediately arises in an analysis of our scheme against adaptive adversaries is that of selective decommitment (cf. [DNRS03] ), that is when an adversary sees a collection of commitments and can select a subset of them and receive their openings. The usual proofs of security of commitment schemes are not known to hold in this case.
Rudich Secret-Sharing from iO
In this section we prove the main theorem of this paper. We show how to construct a Rudich secretsharing scheme for any mNP access structure assuming the existence of efficient indistinguishability obfuscation for P and one-way functions. In Section 4.2 we strengthen this result and show a related construction that only uses an indistinguishability obfuscator for 3CNF formulas (as opposed to all of P). Theorem 1.1 (Restated). If an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator exists for all of P and oneway functions exist, then there is an efficient Rudich secret-sharing scheme for any mNP access structure.
Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } be a set of n parties and let M : 2 P → {0, 1} be an mNP access structure with a verifier V M (see Definition 2.1). We view V M as a polynomial-size circuit. Let iO be an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator and let Com : [2n] × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be a commitment scheme.
The Scheme. For every i ∈ [n], the share of party p i is composed of 2 components: (1) r i ∈ {0, 1} n -an opening of a commitment to the value i, and (2) an obfuscated circuit O(C). The circuit C to be obfuscated has the following hardwired: the secret S and the commitments of all parties (i.e., c i = Com(i, r i ) for i ∈ [n]). We stress that the openings r 1 , . . . , r n of the commitments are not hardwired into the circuit. The input to the circuit C consists of alleged k openings r ′ i 1 , . . . , r ′ i k corresponding to parties p i 1 , . . . , p i k where k, i 1 , . . . , i k ∈ [n] and an alleged witness w. The circuit C first checks that the openings are valid, i.e., verifies that for every j ∈ [k] : c i j = Com(i j , r ′ i j ). Then, it verifies that the given w is a valid witness, i.e., that V M (X, w) = 1. If all the tests pass, C outputs the secret S; otherwise, if any of the tests fail, the circuit C outputs NUL. The secretsharing scheme is formally described in Figure 1 and the circuit C is formally described in Figure 2 .
The Rudich Secret-Sharing Scheme S for M The SETUP Procedure:
Let iO be an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator (see Definition 2.5). Let Com: [2n] × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} q(n) be a string commitment scheme where q(·) is a polynomial (see Definition 2.6).
For i ∈ [n]:
(a) Sample uniformly at random an opening r i ∈ {0, 1} n .
(b) Compute the commitment c i = Com(i, r i ). Figure 2 where C = C S,c1,...,cn consists of the following hardwired: the secret S and the list of commitments c 1 , . . . , c n .
Compute the circuit C from
3. Set the share of party p i to be Π(S, i) = r i , iO(C) .
The RECON Procedure:
Input : A non-empty subset of parties X ⊆ P together with their shares and a witness w of X for M .
1. Let iO(C) be the obfuscated circuit in the shares of X.
2. Evaluate the circuit iO(C) with the shares of X and w and return its output. Observe that if iO and Com are both probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, then the scheme is efficient (i.e., SETUP and RECON are probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms). SETUP generates n commitments and an obfuscated circuit of polynomial size. RECON only evaluates this polynomial-size obfuscated circuit once.
Completeness. In the next lemma we show that the scheme is complete. That is, whenever the scheme is given a qualified X ⊆ P and a valid witness w of X for V M , it is possible to successfully reconstruct the secret. Recall that the shares of the parties in X consist of k openings for the corresponding commitments and an obfuscated circuit iO(C). RECON evaluates the circuit iO(C) given the openings of parties in X and the witness w.
Note that iO perfectly preserves functionality, that is the output of iO(C) is identical to the output of C on every input. Hence, we analyze the output of C given X and w. The verifications in Step 1a pass trivially (since the openings to the commitments are valid) and since w is a valid witness V M (X, w) = 1, the verification in Step 1b passes (see Figure 2) . We get that C (as well as RECON) outputs the secret S.
Indistinguishability of the Secret. We show that our scheme is secure. More precisely, we show that given an "unqualified" set of parties X ⊆ P as input (i.e., M (X) = 0), with overwhelming probability, any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm cannot distinguish the shared secret from another. To this end, we assume towards a contradiction that such an algorithm exists and use it to efficiently solve the following task: given two lists of n commitments and a promise that one of them corresponds to the values {1, . . . , n} and the other corresponds to the values {n + 1, . . . , 2n}, identify which one corresponds to the values {1, . . . , n}. The following lemma shows that solving this task efficiently can be used to break the hiding property of the commitment scheme. 
then there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D ′ and x, y ∈ [2n] such that
The proof of the lemma follows from a standard hybrid argument. See full details in Appendix B.
At this point we are ready to prove the security of our scheme. That is, we show that the ability to break the security of our scheme translates to the ability to break the commitment scheme (using Lemma 4.2).
Lemma 4.3. Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } be a set of n parties. Let M : 2 P → {0, 1} be an mNP access structure. If there exist a non-negligible ε = ε(n) and a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Samp, D) such that for (S 0 , S 1 , X, σ) ← Samp(1 n ) it holds that
then there exists a probabilistic algorithm D ′ that runs in polynomial-time in n/ε such that for sufficiently large n
The proof of Lemma 4.3 appears in Section 4.1. Using Lemma 4.3 we can prove Theorem 1.1, the main theorem of this section. The completeness requirement (Item 2 in Definition 3.1) follows directly from Lemma 4.1. The indistinguishability of the secret requirement (Item 3 in Definition 3.1) follows by combining Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 together with the hiding property of the commitment scheme. Section 4.1 is devoted to the proof of Lemma 4.3.
Main Proof of Security
Let M be an mNP access structure, (Samp, D) be a pair of algorithms and ε > 0 be a function of n, as in the Lemma 4.3. We are given a list of (unopened) string commitments c 1 , . . . , c n ∈ {Com(z i , r)} r∈{0,1} n , where for Z = {z 1 , . . . , z n } either Z = {1, . . . , n} A 0 or Z = {n + 1, . . . , 2n} A 1 . Our goal is to construct an algorithm D ′ that distinguishes between the two cases (using Samp and D) with non-negligible probability (that is related to ε). Recall that Samp chooses two secrets S 0 , S 1 and X ⊆ P and then D gets as input the secret shares of parties in X for one of the secrets. By assumption, for (S 0 , S 1 , X) ← Samp(1 n ) we have that
(1)
Roughly speaking, the algorithm D ′ that we define creates a new set of shares using c 1 , . . . , c n such that: If c 1 , . . . , c n are commitments to Z = A 0 then D is able to recover the secret; otherwise, (if Z = A 1 ) it is computationally hard to recover the secret. Thus, D ′ can distinguish between the two cases by running D on the new set of shares and acting according to its output.
We begin by describing a useful subroutine we call D ver . The inputs to D ver are n string commitments c 1 , . . . , c n , two secrets S 0 , S 1 and a subset of k ∈ [n] parties X. Assume for ease of notations that X = {p 1 , . . . , p k }. D ver first chooses b uniformly at random from the set {0, 1} and samples uniformly at random n openings r 1 , . . . , r n from the distribution U n . Then, D ver computes the circuit C ′ b = C S b ,Com(1,r 1 ),...,Com(k,r k ),c k+1 ,...,cn (see Figure 2) and sets for every i ∈ [n] the share of party p i to be r i , iO(C ′ b ) . Finally, D ver emulates the execution of D on the set of shares Π ′ (S b , X). If the output of D equals to b, then D ver outputs 1 (meaning the input commitments correspond to Z = A 0 ); otherwise, D ver outputs 0 (meaning the input commitments correspond to Z = A 1 ).
The naïve implementation of D ′ is to run Samp to generate S 0 , S 1 and X, run D ver with the given string commitments, S 0 , S 1 and X, and output accordingly. This, however, does not work. To see this, recall that the assumption (eq. (1)) only guarantees that D is able to distinguish between the two secrets when M (X) = 0. However, it is possible that with high probability (yet smaller than 1 − 1/poly(n)) over Samp it holds that M (X) = 1, in which we do not have any guarantee on D. Hence, simply running Samp and D ver might fool us in outputting the wrong answer.
The first step to solve this is to observe that, by the assumption in eq.
(1), Samp generates an X such that M (X) = 0 with (non-negligible) probability at least ε. By this observation, notice that by running Samp for Θ(n/ε) iterations we are assured that with very high probability (specifically, 1 − neg(n)) there exists an iteration in which M (X) = 0. All we are left to do is to recognize in which iteration M (X) = 0 and only in that iteration we run D ver and output accordingly.
However, in general it might be computationally difficult to test for a given X whether M (X) = 0 or not. To overcome this, we observe that we need something much simpler than testing if M (X) = 0 or not. All we actually need is a procedure that we call B that checks if D ver is a good distinguisher (between commitments to A 0 and commitments to A 1 ) for a given X. One the one hand, by the assumption, we are assured that this is indeed the case if M (X) = 0. On the other hand, if M (X) = 1 and D ver is biased, then simply running D ver and outputting accordingly is enough. Thus, our goal is to estimate the bias of D ver . The latter is implemented efficiently by running D ver independently Θ(n/ε) times on both inputs (i.e., with Z = A 0 and with Z = A 1 ) and counting the number of "correct" answers.
Recapping, our construction of D ′ is as follows: D ′ runs for Θ(n/ε) iterations such that in each iteration it runs Samp(1 n ) and gets two secrets S 0 , S 1 and a subset of parties X. Then, it estimates the bias of D ver for that specific X (independently of the input). If the bias is large enough, D ′ evaluates D ver with the input of D ′ , the two secrets S 0 , S 1 and the subset of parties X and outputs its output. The formal description of D ′ is given in Figure 3 .
We prove the following lemma which is a restatement of Lemma 4.3. Let c 1 , . . . , c n ∈ {Com(z i , r)} r∈{0,1} n be a list of string commitments, where for Z = {z 1 , . . . , z n } either Z = {1, . . . , n} A 0 or Z = {n + 1, . . . , 2n} A 1 . Assuming eq. (1), it holds that
Lemma 4.3 (Restated).
The algorithm D ′ Input : A sequence of commitments c 1 , . . . , c n where ∀i ∈ [n] : c i ∈ {Com(z i , r)} r∈{0,1} n and for Z = {z 1 , . . . , z n } either Z = {1, . . . , n} A 0 or Z = {n + 1, . . . , 2n} A 1 .
1. Do the following for T = n/ε times:
(c) If bias = 1:
i. Run resD ← D ver (c 1 , . . . , c n , S 0 , S 1 , X). ii. Output resD (and HALT).
Output 0.
The sub-procedure B Input : Two secrets S 0 , S 1 and a subset of parties X ⊆ P.
1. Set q 0 , q 1 ← 0. Run T B = 4n/ε times:
3. Output 0.
The sub-procedure D ver
Input : A sequence of commitments c 1 , . . . , c n , two secrets S 0 , S 1 and a subset of parties X ⊆ P.
1. Choose b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. We begin with the analysis of the procedure D ver . In the next two claims we show that assuming that M (X) = 0, then D ver is a good distinguisher between the case Z = A 0 and the case Z = A 1 . Specifically, the first claim states that D ver answers correctly given input Z = A 0 with probability at least 1/2 + ε/2 while in the second claim we show that D ver is unable to do much better than merely guessing given input Z = A 1 (assuming M (X) = 0).
For
Proof. By the definition of D ver (see Figure 3) we have that D ver (c 1 , . . . , c k , S 0 , S 1 , X) = 1 if and
Since b is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}, it is enough to show that
Using the assumption (see eq.
(1)), for (S 0 , S 1 , X) ← Samp(1 n ) it holds that
Notice that since Z = A 0 we have that the sequence (Com(1,
Proof. Recall that D ver (c 1 , . . . , c n , S 0 , S 1 , X) = 1 if and only if for b chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} it holds that
Recall that for b ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ [n] the new share of party p i denoted by Π ′ (S b , i) consists of the pair r b i , iO(C ′ b ) where r b i is chosen uniformly at random from U n . To prove the claim we show that iO(C ′ 0 ) and iO(C ′ 1 ) are computationally indistinguishable. To this end, we show that if Z = A 1 , then it holds that C ′ 0 is equivalent to the NUL circuit. The same proof shows that C ′ 1 is equivalent to the NUL circuit, as well. Fix an input to C ′ 0 and let X ′ ⊆ P be the corresponding set of parties. Recall that C ′ 0 verifies that the given openings are valid, runs the verifier on the input and if any test fails, it outputs NUL.
If X ′ ⊆ X, then there exists an i ∈ [n] such that p i ∈ X ′ and p i / ∈ X. In this case, the opening verification test of C ′ 0 will fail: Since Z = A 1 , for every i such that p i / ∈ X the commitment c i (that is hardwired in the circuit C ′ 0 ) is a commitment to the value n + i (and not i). Recall that the distributions Com(i, U n ) and Com(j, U n ) are disjoint for every i = j. Hence, any opening for the commitment c i and the value i is invalid, i.e., any opening r ′ i will fail the test c i ?
= Com(i, r ′ i ) (see Step 1a in Figure 2 ).
Otherwise, if X ′ ⊆ X, then since M is monotone and M (X) = 0 it holds that M (X ′ ) = 0. Therefore, there is no witness for X ′ , hence, the verifier V M will reject causing C ′ 0 to output NUL (see Step 1b in Figure 2 ).
In conclusion, for any input, C ′ 0 (resp., C ′ 1 ) outputs NUL. Since both C ′ 0 and C ′ 1 are equivalent to the NUL circuit and they are of the same size, their obfuscations are computationally indistinguishable from one another (see Definition 2.5) and the claim follows.
Next, we continue with two claims connecting D ver and B. Before we state these claims, we introduce a useful notation regarding the bias of the procedure D ver . We denote by bias(S 0 , S 1 , X) the advantage of D ver in recognizing the case Z = A 0 over the case Z = A 1 given two secrets S 0 and S 1 and a subset of parties X. Namely, for any S 0 , S 1 and X denote
The first claim states that if D ver is biased (in the sense that bias(S 0 , S 1 , X) is large enough), then B almost surely notices that and outputs 1, and vice-versa, i.e., if D ver is unbiased (in the sense that bias(S 0 , S 1 , X) is small enough), then B almost surely notices that and outputs 0.
Proof. Recall that B runs for T B independent iterations such that in each iteration it executes D ver twice: Once with Com(1, U n ), . . . , Com(n, U n ) and once with Com(n + 1, U n ), . . . , Com(2n, U n ). For i ∈ [T B ], let I i 0 be an indicator random variable that takes the value 1 if and only if in the i-th iteration D ver (Com(1, U n ), . . . , Com(n, U n ), S 0 , S 1 , X) = 1. Similarly, denote by I i 1 an indicator random variable that takes the value 1 if and only if in the i-th iteration D ver (Com(n + 1, U n ), . . . , Com(2n, U n ), S 0 , S 1 , X) = 1. When B finishes, it holds that q 0 =
Similarly, if bias(S 0 , S 1 , X) ≤ ε/10 we get that E [|q 0 − q 1 |] ≤ (ε/10) · T B . By Chernoff's bound we get that
Recall that B outputs 1 if and only if |q 0 − q 1 | > n. Plugging in T B = 4n/ε both parts of the claim follow.
In Claim 4.6 we proved that B is a good estimator for the bias of D ver . That is, we showed that if D ver is very biased, then B is 1 (with high probability) and vice-versa (i.e., that if D ver is unbiased, then B is most likely to be 0). Denote by BAD the event in which B(S 0 , S 1 , X) = 1 and bias(S 0 , S 1 , X) ≤ ε/10. In the next claim we show that the probability that BAD happens in any iteration of D ′ is negligible. Pr ∀i :
Proof. Since the T iteration are independent and implemented identically it holds that Pr ∃i :
Observe that
Hence, we get that Pr ∃i :
The next claim states that if X is such that M (X) = 0, then B outputs 1 with very high probability. The idea is to combine Claims 4.4 and 4.5 that assure that if M (X) = 0, then D ver is biased (i.e., bias is large), with Claim 4.6 that assures that if the bias is large, then B almost surely outputs 1.
Proof. Let (S 0 , S 1 , X) ← Samp(1 n ). By the definition of B it holds that B(S 0 , S 1 , X) = 1 if and only if q 0 − q 1 > n. Thus, it is enough to show that
Using Claims 4.4 and 4.5 we get that
Plugging this into Claim 4.6 the claim follows.
At this point we are finally ready to prove Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Recall that our goal is to lower bound the following expression:
Notice that one property of M that follows from the assumption in eq. (1) is that Pr[M (X) = 0] ≥ ε (where the probability if over Samp). Combining this fact with the fact that D ′ makes T = n/ε iterations of B and Pr [B(S 0 , S 1 , X) = 1 | M (X) = 0] ≥ 1 − neg(n) (by Claim 4.8), we get that D ′ reaches Step 2 with negligible probability. In other words, with probability 1 − neg(n) there is an iteration in which X is chosen such that M (X) = 0 and B outputs 1. For the rest of the proof we assume that this is indeed the case (and lose a negligible additive term).
Furthermore, using Claim 4.7 we may also assume that in every iteration BAD does not happen. That is, in every iteration either B outputs 0 or bias is larger than ε/10. Recall that D ′ ignores all the iteration in which B outputs 0. Moreover, we assumed that there is an iteration in which B outputs 1. In that iteration, it must be the case that the bias is larger than ε/10 which completes the proof.
Rudich Secret-Sharing from iO for 3CNF Formulas
In this section we show how to strengthen Theorem 1.1 and give a related construction of Rudich secret-sharing scheme for every mNP access structure that requires only an indistinguishability obfuscator for 3CNF formulas. The main result of this section is stated next.
Theorem 4.9. If an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator exists for the family of 3CNF formulas and one-way functions exist, then there is an efficient Rudich secret-sharing scheme for any mNP access structure.
The proof of Theorem 4.9 relies on the fact that it is possible to (efficiently and uniformly) transform every Boolean circuit C that computes a function in P into a 3CNF formula F such that F (g(x)) = C(x), where g is some efficiently computable function that translates an input of C into an input of F (see Lemma 4.10). Roughly speaking, we use this translation to transform the circuit in the secret-sharing scheme (see Figures 1 and 2 ) into a 3CNF formula and let the reconstruction procedure compute the transformation g.
For completeness, in the next lemma we show how to translate a general circuit into a 3CNF formula with the desired properties described above.
Lemma 4.10. There exists a uniform polynomial-time algorithm ToCNF such that for any n, ToCNF takes as input a polynomial-size circuit C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} and outputs a 3CNF formula F such that:
1. F is of size O(|C|) and has |C| variables.
2. There exists an efficiently computable function g g C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} |C| such that ∀x ∈ {0, 1} n : F (g(x)) = C(x).
Proof. Let t = |C|. The algorithm ToCNF define t variables w 1 , . . . , w t that correspond to the wires of C. Then, for every gate in C, it computes the corresponding 3CNF formula that verifies consistency between the value of the two input variables and the output variable depending on the gate. Finally, ToCNF outputs the AND of these 3CNF formulas (which is a 3CNF formula).
The function g on input x evaluates C(x) and outputs the value of the computation on each wire. Since C is of polynomial-size, g is efficiently computable. Moreover, by the definition of g, ∀x ∈ {0, 1} n : F (g(x)) = C(x).
Next, we prove the main theorem of this section: Theorem 4.9.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 4.9. The construction of the Rudich secret-sharing scheme is very similar to the construction given in Figure 1 . Assume for simplicity that the secret is a single bit (to deal with arbitrary long secret we deal with each bit separately). We describe the differences of the new scheme.
Let C be the circuit from the setup procedure (see Figure 1) and C be the circuit C without the secret and the commitments hardwired. Let F ToCNF( C) and g g C be as in Lemma 4.10, such that ∀x : F ( g(x)) = C(x). Set F to be the 3CNF formula F with the secret and the commitments hardwired: That is, fix the variables in F that correspond to the wires of the secret and the commitments in C. It is easy to see that by fixing the corresponding coordinates in g we get a function g such that ∀x : F (g(x)) = C(x) . In the SETUP procedure, instead of obfuscating C, we obfuscate the 3CNF formula F . We modify the RECON procedure accordingly: first compute g(X), evaluate the obfuscation of F on g(X) and output that value.
The completeness of the new scheme follows immediately from Lemma 4.10 since the circuit F (g(·)) is equivalent to the circuit C(·). The proof that the new scheme is secure follows similar lines to the proof that the original scheme is secure. Specifically, the main difference is that the reconstruction algorithm also evaluates g which only depends on the circuit C and not the hardwired values. In particular, g holds no information about the secret.
Conclusions and Open Problems
We have shown a construction of a secret-sharing scheme for any mNP access structure. In fact, our construction yields the first computational secret-sharing scheme for all monotone functions in P (recall that not every monotone function in P can be computed by a polynomial-size monotone circuit, see e.g., Razborov's lower bound for matching [Raz85] ). Our result seems to strengthen the view of indistinguishability obfuscation as a "central hub" for cryptography [SW13] .
Our construction only requires indistinguishability obfuscation for 3CNF formulas. As we have mentioned, a simple candidate for such an obfuscator for 3CNF formulas that is provably secure in an idealized algebraic model was recently suggested by Brakerski and Rothblum [BR14a] . It may be easier to achieve a construction of a 3CNF obfuscator in the standard model based on standard hardness assumptions than an obfuscator for P (see [BR14a, BR14b] ). In fact, there is no impossibility result for virtual black-box obfuscation for 3CNFs. We conclude with several open problems:
• Is there a secret-sharing scheme for mNP (even for specific monotone NP-complete problems) that relies only on standard hardness assumptions or at least falsifiable ones?
• Is there a way to use secret-sharing for monotone P to achieve secret-sharing for monotone NP (in a black-box manner)?
• Construct a Rudich secret-sharing scheme for every access structure in mNP that is secure against adaptive adversaries (see Section 3.2 for a discussion).
Under a stronger obfuscation assumption, i.e., virtual black-box obfuscation or even extractability obfuscation (cf. [BGI + 12, BCP14]), Zvika Brakerski observed that our construction is secure against adaptive adversaries as well.
• Is there a general way to transform any protocol that uses a trusted (third) party T into one that does not use T but uses an indistinguishability obfuscator instead?
inputs S 0 , S 1 , Π(S b , X) and σ ′ . Note that D ′ does not know the bit b. Denote by F ′ ⊆ F the set of function f ∈ F for which f (S 0 ) = f (S 1 ). Observe that with probability strictly larger than 0 over a random choice of f from F it holds that f ∈ F ′ (i.e., F ′ is not empty). Then, over the randomness of Samp 
On the other hand, since X does not have any information about S 0 , S 1 and b is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}, for any algorithm D ′′ and every f ∈ F ′ it holds that Pr D ′′ (1 n , X, σ ′ ) = f (S b ) = 1/2.
Thus,
Combining eqs. (3) and (4) we get that for any f ∈ F ′ :
which contradicts the unlearnability requirement of Definition 3.2.
B Proof of Lemma 4.2
In this section we prove the following lemma. 
C On Completeness for Rudich Secret-Sharing
In this section we characterize which languages in mNP are the "hardest" for Rudich secret-sharing: languages for which the existence of a Rudich secret-sharing scheme implies a scheme for all mNP. We observe that if one has a secret-sharing scheme for a language in mNP that is also complete for mNP under monotone-circuit witness-preserving reductions (to be defined next), then we could get a secret-sharing scheme for all mNP.
all mNP. MCWP-reduction require two properties. The second property (i.e., that it is witness preserving) usually follows immediately from the correctness of the reduction (a thorough discussion is given by Lynch and Lipton [LL78] ). However, the first property (of circuit monotonicity) is more subtle and harder to achieve.
A specific type of reductions that satisfies the first property of Definition C.1, called monotone projection translations, was introduced by Skyum and Valiant [SV85] and further studied by Stewart [Ste95] . A monotone projection of a Boolean function is a function obtained by substituting for each of its variables a variable or a constant. 10 Stewart [Ste95] proved that the problem DHam s,t of deciding whether a digraph has a Hamiltonian path between two specified vertices s, t and the problem CUB of deciding whether a given graph has a cubic subgraph (i.e., a subgraph where each vertex has degree 3) are complete for mNP via monotone projection translations.
